For a strong understanding of and lesson in counterinsurgency doctrine the new US Army-Marine field manual on counterinsurgency operations, is a useful guide...
A primary point it teaches is that a hostile / fearful ill treated populations will pose worse dilemmas than any hostile enemy soldier.
Tactical flexibility... employs and adjusts the ‘winning hearts and minds' doctrine to a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood basis.
Cadres must relate correctly to the factual issues they find in the specific areas on the ground instead of using a less effective ‘blanket approach’ to the mission based upon the assumption that our cause is right and 'shared by all'.
The creation of thorough zone by zone INTEL, AGITPROP and infiltration programs with fixed lines of operation (which act as barriers between ‘safe / secure’ areas and ‘unsafe / unsecure’ areas) will be placed around areas of infiltration. This policy is a viable innovation, affording less risky methods than a more rigid form, of ‘area take over by imposition’ by those same forces.
All such deployments will find that the different populations encountered will display a mix of welcome euphoria and sceptical hostility before accepting the presence of the cadres as matter of fact.
(Area) situational awareness is a prime tenet of flexible tactics: the approach is not described in the new field manual, but does, in some specific cases, fit perfectly with it, and with the classical doctrine on which it is based.
Patrol with the aim of making the host populations want to create a welcoming environment for our cadres, ensure that community leaders know the benefits of the cadres presence, greet children, cooperative local businessmen, and others.
Be aware of the fears caused by conflict and people living for years under an obviously corrupt influence. Impeccable manners and standards of behaviour must apply – a small thing, but in operations where rapport with the populace is key; a critical one.
Blend this approach with the capability to partner positive development, effectively communicating the non-kinetic (non war fighting) tactics required down to the lower ranks;
Have a series of guidelines titled “Unit Guidance,” highly visible, clearly stating the objectives in the area and in general, that describes in detail the four “key tasks” of control, partnership, civil works, and governance.
Accept the usefulness of this aspect of counterinsurgency, believe – you can win hearts and minds and displace the enemy doctrine of fear and selfishness... this stuff will work, it does not take -------- forever. That kind of patience in the face of adversity is exactly what counterinsurgency requires for success.
Commanders must learn about urban warfare strategy and counterinsurgency and develop the approach a list of books on counterinsurgency – some classics and some more obscure – and on combating organized crime exist.
An cadre who is not afraid to be candid who can learn in order to save lives is the ultimate professional in both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare, personality counts for less than an approach that will help give all of us a fighting chance at success in the unbelievably complex task of building and implementing peace in our nation.
Counterinsurgency at the street level.
Patrol mounted and on foot with a security squad overwatch. Unit leaders, on patrol 3 DAYS- THEN PLANNING) create a number of mutually supportive C-OP, the 'combat outpost' that the cadres must establish at strategic points in each sector, have regular truthful 'update briefings' on the battle / plan.
Apply conventional as well as classical, non-kinetic counterinsurgency tactics, be patient, and seek the results through the quality of your units’ actions.
The aim is to counter the idea within our nation that fear must override everything. The regime has made many areas places that are festering havens of heavily armed thugs and loyalist militants...
We are seeking to create an environment that is effective and secure, to the point that we do not want any negative OPFOR dominance (PSYCHOLOCICAL or PHYSICAL) in those havens and secure areas. Send out scouting or surveillance elements to INTEL gather regularly in all zones. (Quality verifiable intelligence).
The opponent has a history of intimidation by armed elements / and infiltration by agents in these areas and remains an extremely active influence. The result we seek is to nullify this psychologically as well as militarily in all areas of operations.
Although the OPFOR could always return, and many are at a loss as to how to roll back the pervasive influence of the past years of NEAR ‘one party state’ domination on civilian infrastructure, security for our people must be completely solid.
How will we reach this point? At a more basic level, it stems from effective and simultaneous prosecution of operations along all four lines identified to the cadres in the command guidance: control, partnership, civil works, and governance. – a difficult proposition –unless all four lines are being pursued at once, regardless of which one seems most important at the time, no success in any will be sustained.
The first piece of the equation, and the most controversial, is control, which command guidance defines as “preventing the enemy from operating effectively in the area of operations.” Control is the one element of counterinsurgency that is critical, but it is also the most misunderstood and misused element; it was, for example, in the name of controlling the area of operations that the opponent routinely intimidates villages and other citizens launching the brutally aggressive sweeps that have now led to murder and other charges.
But control is also the name of the game when carefully cordoned off zones, are advanced through, and multiple C-OPs are set up in the city enabling the clearances that lead to sustained security in the aftermath of combat. Most combat commanders, although not all theoreticians of counterinsurgency should recognize that before rebuilding and governance projects can go forward, a basic threshold of security must be met.
The challenge and controversy of control operations is “correctly estimating where that threshold lies, and not either shifting focus to the next phase too early or prolonging the kinetic raids and sweeps that make up the control part so long that you cause problems.” The problems, of course, are the often severe consequences when troops use greater force than necessary, as doctrine for conventional combat requires them to: “If we enter 10 areas but in the process create new enemies that is not a productive operation.”
In area of operations, where the opponents’ military presence is minimal, more covert and economic than military; internal issues of strife may exist, a sensitive understanding of the threshold for influence and control operations must create a near law enforcement-like posture from the cadres.
If we need doors kicked in or an objective stormed, and if there is a strong, imminent threat, the cadres will fight.
Though, that is not what is always required, so it is not what we do. For example, we can set up a fictitious situation to lure opponents rather than disrupt whole areas. But it’s about what’s needed where.
That operational flexibility, and other plans like it, mixed with conventional war fighting, are how we will beat a well organised astute adversary – by tricking him and or dragging him into positions where its obvious that all resistence is futile, but not always by shooting only, and kicking in doors.
little man versus big machine
BETRAYAL 1: PSEUDO GUERRILLAS PRETEND TO BE LIBERATION FIGHTERS
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