Hearts and Minds Doctrine and Control /Partnership Methods....THE ETHOS OF THE INSURGENCY part 3

The OPFOR (opposing force) counterinsurgency procedure is set upon two main pillars, the traditional counter terrorist, anti guerrilla warfare and counter revolutionary warfare (CRW) policy and doctrine of modern conventional armed forces and the methods used by non conventional 'Maoist' guerrilla forces.

Tried and tested the OPFOR system is based upon an overall strategy of ‘area / resource denial’ this involves an all out effort to cut opponents off from all means of shelter and supply and any 'positive' interaction with the host population.

Tactics used... intimidation and instilling terror including beatings, torture, murder, the withdrawing of food and other services, bribery, information gathering, spying and infiltration, the formation of cordons and check points around 'marked' areas, the carrying out ‘pungwes’ (public punishments) in the middle of the night. The setting up of torture / political indoctrination camps, ambushes and raids having troops/militias kicking in doors and knocking everything around.

All persons within a determined troublespot are considered 'potential enemy combatants' and are heavily vetted and monitored.

This OPFOR ethos of instilling state sponsored terror leads us to conclude that there is no room in our war fighting doctrine, or reason, for the abuse of civilians... that is a rule written in stone with absolutely NO...caveat of... unless it is necessary.

Command guidance notes put equal emphasis on EACH of the tasks control, partnership, civil works, and governance:

The key difference between the two approaches (kinetic and non-kinetic) in the implementation of a policy of control / partnership is that the first brings surface success and yet harbours within it the seeds of deep rooted failure.

The important thing is to recognize that there is more to any security operation than kinetic methods alone. We must avoid all wrong focus, which solely places emphasis on effects (what happened) while leaving the causes (why it happened) unnoticed or unharmed.

Security means targetting OPFOR at their weakest points using unilateral and combined raids, conducting persistent surveillance from observation points, and established C-OPs.

Building a series of C-OP, or ‘combat outpost’, is an integral part of the operation of every command.
C-OP are to be built where they are most useful. Force protection, patrols and C-OP use should not limit but rather must facilitate your ability to establish a successful control operation. The emphasis must be on the flexible application of counterinsurgency doctrine (using what works best at the point of incident), on the quality of the patrolling as well as on where the patrols are based.

Surveillance doctrine must be practiced until it comes naturally to the degree that building properly sited C-OPs must become second nature to the cadres. Understanding what the military calls “human terrain,” or the geographical breakdown of a population by class, ethnicity, religion, politics, and other criteria, is an absolutely essential element of successful counterinsurgency.

This INTEL / ‘hearts and minds’ intensive control / partnership approach is frustrating to many soldiers, who joined up to fight the bad guys and trained for that, but defeat caused by poor situation awareness and poor public relations does nothing to help anyones morale.

Understand the frustration, and in limited ways share it; as part of a organisation that allows innovation cadres can think whatever they want to think. But they have to be soldiers and do a professional job – and, no matter what they think, that’s exactly what they must do... Soldiers will probably never like knocking on doors and asking instead of kicking them down but just because they hate it doesn’t mean they won’t do it well.

The method for gathering “human terrain” data, though, is as frustrating to combat-oriented infantrymen spending hours walking the streets or peering through binoculars at the top of high rises, observing and noting everything that happens and everyone who goes by, might often seem to be worse than useless, but when the stakes are life and death, that’s the difficult reality.

Sometimes the job at hand will not seem worth the sacrifices made; our soldiers may, criticize their mission with every breath but they must also perform that mission impeccably.
While every soldier at every level knows that the war cannot be won without devoting effort to training often what seems like the sheer incompetence and unprofessionalism of some quarters of the opposition breeds disrespect and that is the start of the road to miserable discipline varying proportions of amusement, disgust, and fury. Security personnel are risking not just their lives but the lives of their entire families this is easy to forget this fact under these circumstances. It isn’t a recipe for trust and patience, but patience is what’s required – there is no other way.

The third and fourth elements of the mission – rebuilding municipal infrastructure and government – Probably the hardest of all post conflict tasks will be partnering with former foes from the Army and Police, and National Security forces. The task will be frustrating for many soldiers who will probably not stay in areas long enough to see these parts of the mission pay off, but studies show such efforts have improved civil infrastructure drastically: patrols alongside the work carried out by engineers can provide safe well maintained streets, clean water and newly installed generators that ensure that many homes have light and power.

Where the political dictatorship / Army Junta dominated, absolutely everything, has seen much less progress and is not likely to advance quickly. Practicing hearts and minds doctrine is boring for some soldiers and infuriating for others, but recognize the necessity of the work, soldier on and get it done, collecting trash or clearing fields as ordered the dull, pedestrian nature of the reconstruction / security job that so many cadres will find themselves doing. It is how it works, and with a bit of skill and patience, it is how counterinsurgency will work in many other neighbourhoods after they have been cleared.

The monotonous, frustrating duties that form counterinsurgency operations pay dividends: although vast amounts of work need to be done, the aim is creating stability, so that civilian infrastructure and economy can slowly improve. At the forefront of the change process the cadres must prove patient and adept at the difficult task of war fighting, rebuilding and keeping the peace.